How Drone Warfare Has Transformed Maneuver: Alexander the Great’s Speed vs. Russia’s Attrition in Ukraine

Alexander’s Lightning Conquests of Persia (334–323 BC)

Map of Alexander the Great’s empire in 323 BC, spanning from Greece and Egypt through Persia to northwest India. Alexander III of Macedon led one of history’s fastest and farthest-reaching campaigns. In just a decade, he marched his army (~40,000–50,000 strong) thousands of kilometers, toppling the Achaemenid Persian Empire and beyond. After winning the Battle of Granicus in 334 BC, Alexander conquered most of Western Asia Minor within about a yeareurope.factsanddetails.com. Major ports and cities (Ephesus, Halicarnassus, etc.) fell rapidly, securing his supply lines along the Aegean coast. By 332 BC, following his victory at Issus (333 BC), he swept down the Eastern Mediterranean: Syria, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Egypt all fell within months – many cities opened their gates without a fighteurope.factsanddetails.comeurope.factsanddetails.com. The only major delay was the siege of Tyre (332 BC), which took seven months of intensive engineering and cost significant efforteurope.factsanddetails.comeurope.factsanddetails.com.

After securing the Mediterranean flank, Alexander struck into the Persian heartland. He met Darius III’s main army at Gaugamela in 331 BC and decisively defeated it. Thanks to bold maneuver (a feigned flank attack followed by a cavalry charge at Darius) and disciplined phalanx tactics, Alexander shattered the much larger Persian force and sent Darius fleeingtimemaps.comtimemaps.com. The victory at Gaugamela opened the gates of the Persian capitals – Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis – which Alexander seized in quick succession in late 331 to 330 BCtimemaps.comtimemaps.com. In essentially three years of campaigning (334–331 BC), Alexander had destroyed the Persian Empire’s military power and overrun its core territories. Over the next few years he pushed further east through today’s Iran, Central Asia, and into India (defeating King Porus at Hydaspes in 326 BC), before his army, exhausted, halted at the Hyphasis. By the time of his death in 323 BC, Alexander had conquered an empire of over 5 million square kilometersmatinabad.commatinabad.com – an unprecedented territory “won by the spear.”

Campaign Speed and Logistics: Alexander’s pace of advance was astonishing for the ancient world. He consistently covered vast distances at speed: for example, after Tyre’s fall in 332, he marched ~500 km from Egypt to Mesopotamia within a year to confront Darius at Gaugamela. His strategy focused on maneuver warfare at the campaign level – seeking decisive battles to break enemy armies, after which cities and provinces surrendered rapidly. This emphasis on defeating the Persian field forces allowed quick territorial gains (e.g. Asia Minor in one yeareurope.factsanddetails.com, the entire Persian Empire effectively in ~3 years). Alexander’s logistics, famously analyzed by Donald Engels, were tailored to speed and mobility. He kept a relatively light baggage train, lived off the land when possible, and secured coastal supply lines by taking port cities. He also commandeered the Royal Road and the vast stores of the Persian empire to support deeper incursions. Notably, after Gaugamela, the capture of Babylon and Susa provided enormous treasure to pay his troops and local satrapal resources to provision his armytimemaps.com. Alexander’s ability to integrate operations and logistics – striking fast but also ensuring supply (even via naval support in the early stages) – was key to his sustained blitzfaoajournal.substack.com. Only on rare occasions did his logistics falter (e.g. the Gedrosian Desert march back from India, which was costly but a strategic choice to punish a rebellious satrap).

Casualty Ratios and Outcomes: Alexander’s campaign was marked by remarkably favorable casualty ratios in battle, highlighting the efficacy of his tactics and army professionalism. In set-piece battles, his losses were a fraction of the enemy’s. Ancient sources claim, for example, Macedonian losses of only a few hundred at the Battle of Issus (333 BC) and Gaugamela (331 BC), versus tens of thousands of Persian casualties (modern estimates still put Persian losses in the many thousands, vastly exceeding Macedonian dead)timemaps.combrain-byts.com. At Granicus, roughly 400 Greeks were killed compared to about 6,000 Persianstimemaps.com. Overall, by the end of the conquest of Persia, Alexander had inflicted catastrophic losses on his opponents – over one million enemy casualties by some countsen.wikipedia.org – while his core Macedonian army, though diminished by years of campaigning, remained intact and cohesive. The casualty asymmetry was aided by Alexander’s superior generalship, the discipline of the Macedonian phalanx and Companion cavalry, and the often-poor morale and coordination of the Persian forces. Strategically, Alexander’s maneuver-oriented approach minimized protracted attrition; once he won a decisive battle, he gained huge territories without fighting sieges or guerrilla campaigns in every locale (most satraps surrendered or were replaced with minimal fighting). The result was a swift conquest of a vast empire at a relatively low cost to his own army.

However, Alexander’s campaign, while lightning-fast, was aided by unique conditions of his era: he faced a centralized imperial opponent that, once its king and main army were defeated, collapsed politically, enabling rapid occupation. The Persian communications and road network, once seized, actually facilitated Alexander’s logistics. In sum, Alexander’s campaign exemplified high-tempo maneuver warfare – using speed, surprise, and decisive engagements to outrun the enemy’s ability to react – yielding an empire from the Nile to the Indus in a single relentless campaign.

Russia’s Campaign in Ukraine: Slow Advances and Stalemate (2022–2025)

In stark contrast to Alexander’s swift conquests, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (launched February 24, 2022) has been characterized by rapid initial advances followed by prolonged stagnation, grinding attrition, and extremely costly progress. The Russian military (estimated ~150–190,000 troops in the initial assault) attacked on multiple fronts, expecting a quick victory. In the first days, Russian units surged deep into Ukrainian territory: armored columns raced toward Kyiv from Belarus, pushed into Kharkiv in the northeast, and swept northward from Crimea into Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in the southen.wikipedia.orgen.wikipedia.org. This was a modern attempt at blitzkrieg – a maneuver warfare approach aiming to decapitate Ukraine’s leadership and seize key terrain swiftly. By early March 2022, Russian spearheads had reached the outskirts of Kyiv and occupied large swathes of southern Ukraine, achieving roughly 20% of Ukraine’s territory under Russian control at peak advanceaxios.com. However, these gains were short-lived and came at mounting cost. The initial lightning offensive stalled within weeks – Russia failed to take Kyiv (its airborne raid on Hostomel Airport was repelled, and the 40-mile convoy north of Kyiv bogged down) and could not break Ukrainian resistance in key cities.

Stagnation and Logistical Breakdown: Russia’s campaign speed rapidly slowed to a crawl by April 2022, owing to fierce Ukrainian defense and major Russian logistical and command failures. Notably, the widely observed 40-mile convoy on the Kyiv axis became emblematic of Russia’s problems: it stalled for days due to lack of fuel, food, and spare parts, essentially stranded by logistical collapsedefenseone.comdefenseone.com. Pentagon intelligence in March 2022 noted the convoy “not moving at any rate that would lead one to believe they’ve solved their problems” – Russian forces had only packed 3 days of rations and minimal fuel, expecting Ukraine’s quick capitulationdefenseone.comdefenseone.com. This underestimation led to supply lines overstretching and grinding to a halt. As a result, by early April 2022, Russia withdrew from northern Ukraine (abandoning the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy offensives) after suffering heavy losses and failing to encircle the capitalen.wikipedia.org. The invasion’s focus shifted to the Donbas (eastern front), where Russia had shorter supply lines. Throughout mid-2022, Russian forces concentrated on incremental advances in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts – relying on massive artillery bombardments to take cities like Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk in June–July 2022. These gains were slow (often a few kilometers per week) and came only after destroying the areas with overwhelming firepower.

By fall 2022, momentum had shifted. Ukraine, leveraging interior lines and Western-supplied arms, launched a surprise counteroffensive in Kharkiv oblast (September 2022), recapturing ~6,000 km² in a matter of days and collapsing Russia’s northern Donbas flank. Another Ukrainian push in the south forced Russia to abandon Kherson city by November 2022. Thus, after roughly 9 months of war, Russia’s territorial holdings in Ukraine actually decreased from their early high – by late 2022 Russia held about 15–18% of Ukraine (down from ~20%), having lost significant ground in Kharkiv and Khersonaxios.comen.wikipedia.org. The frontline then largely stabilized over the winter of 2022–23, with both sides digging in.

Since early 2023, Russia’s campaign has devolved into grinding attritional warfare with extremely slow, costly territorial changes. A stark example is the Battle of Bakhmut (Aug 2022 – May 2023): Russian forces (led by Wagner Group mercenaries) spent nine months to capture the small city of Bakhmut in Donetsk oblast. The fighting was urban and positional, with Russia advancing only a few kilometers after repeated assaults. The casualty cost was staggering – by Wagner’s own admission, they lost over 20,000 fighters just in the Bakhmut battlepbs.org, many of them convicts used as assault troops. Western estimates indicated Russia suffered five casualties for every Ukrainian casualty in that battlethemoscowtimes.com. For a city of only ~40 sq km, this was an enormous human cost. Despite finally occupying Bakhmut in May 2023, the victory was pyrrhic, and the Russians gained no significant strategic advantage.

Through 2023 and into 2024, Russia has continued offensive operations primarily in eastern Ukraine (e.g. around Avdiivka, the Svatove-Kreminna line, and toward towns in Donetsk oblast). These efforts have yielded minimal territory. Analyses indicate that since the start of 2022, the front lines have moved very little overall – “battle lines haven’t shifted all that much since 2022 despite heavy casualties on both sides,” with Russia still occupying roughly one-fifth of Ukraine (including Crimea and parts of Donbas held since 2014)axios.com. In fact, in all of 2024, Russian forces managed to seize only about 4,168 km² of additional territory (mostly small rural areas in Donetsk/Luhansk)euromaidanpress.com. This amounts to roughly 0.7% of Ukraine – or as one analysis put it, “Putin only managed to take around 1% of Ukraine’s territory in 2024”axios.com. The tempo of operations is glacial: for instance, during a renewed Russian offensive in late 2024, Russian troops advanced an average of ~28 sq km per day in November (largely in thinly populated areas)kyivindependent.com – and even that modest pace was achieved by accepting huge daily casualties (over 1,500 casualties per day in Nov 2024 according to Ukrainian and Western reports)kyivindependent.com.

Casualty Ratios and “Cost per Kilometer”: The Russian campaign in Ukraine has been marked by extraordinarily high casualties relative to territory gained. Unlike Alexander’s battles where his losses were minimal, Russia has suffered tens of thousands of losses for every small objective. By early 2025, Western intelligence estimated over 700,000 Russian soldiers killed or wounded in the warrussiamatters.org (vs. perhaps ~400,000 Ukrainian casualties), an astonishing figure in just three years of fighting. When measured against Russia’s territorial gains, the toll is even more striking. Analysts calculated that Russian losses amount to roughly 10.5 casualties per square kilometer of territory captured, making it one of the worst loss-to-gain ratios in modern historyeuromaidanpress.com. (For comparison, this exceeds even World War I offensives; only the Korean War saw a slightly higher ratio of about 11.4 casualties per km²euromaidanpress.com.) In 2024 specifically, Russia’s bloody pushes in Donbas yielded those ~4,168 km² at the cost of ~427,000 Russian casualties – about 102 casualties per square kilometer gained in that yeareuromaidanpress.com. Individual operations illustrate this extreme attrition: a UK intelligence report noted that Russia’s fall 2024 offensive cost ~53 Russian casualties per square kilometer advancedkyivindependent.com. And as mentioned, the Bakhmut fight cost Russia tens of thousands of men for one small citypbs.org. These numbers underscore a fundamental feature of the Ukraine war: it has become a war of attrition, where territory changes hands slowly and at tremendous human cost. The casualty ratio often favors the defender (Ukraine) – for example, across the conflict, estimates suggest Russia’s losses are somewhat higher than Ukraine’s, and in localized battles like Bakhmut or Vuhledar, Russian assault units have taken vastly disproportionate losses for little gainthemoscowtimes.com. This is the inverse of Alexander’s battles (where the attacker – Alexander – had far fewer losses than the defender). In Ukraine, well-prepared defenses, modern firepower, and Russian tactical errors have made offensive operations extremely costly.

Logistics and Strategy: Russia’s invasion planning assumed a short campaign, and when that failed, their logistics and strategy had to shift. By mid-2022, Russia resorted to what its doctrine calls “attrition artillery offensives” – unleashing enormous volumes of artillery to pulverize targets before inching forward. This reflected a failure of maneuver: Russian armored thrusts without proper infantry or air support led to disasters (e.g. dozens of tanks ambushed and destroyed outside Kyiv and Kharkiv early on). As the war dragged on, supply constraints (ammunition shortages, equipment losses under sanctions) further slowed Russia’s pace. Still, Russia’s interior lines (proximity to its own rail network) have allowed it to keep funneling troops and shells to the front. The logistical contrast with Alexander’s campaign is stark: where Alexander penetrated deep into Asia by securing supply routes as he advanced, Russian forces in Ukraine never secured dominance beyond their front line – Ukrainian interdiction (partisan attacks, HIMARS strikes on depots) continually strains Russian supply lines. For instance, Ukraine’s strikes on ammo dumps and the Kerch bridge have forced Russia to extend and convolute its supply routes, hampering any rapid large-scale thrust. Strategically, Russia’s initial maneuver approach (a multi-axis lightning strike) gave way to a grinding positional strategy, focusing on wearing down the Ukrainian army rather than outflanking it. By 2023–24, both sides were effectively in a stalemate of trenches, mines, and artillery reminiscent of mid-20th-century wars, not rapid conquests.

Comparative Campaign Metrics

To crystallize the differences between Alexander’s ancient campaign and Russia’s modern one, the following table highlights key metrics:

In summary, Alexander’s campaign was the epitome of high-speed maneuver warfare, rapidly toppling an empire, whereas Russia’s campaign in Ukraine has demonstrated the limits of maneuver in modern peer conflict, devolving into slow attritional fighting. The sheer discrepancy in pace (a continent conquered in a few years vs. a brutal struggle over relatively small regions for years) and casualty efficiency highlights how warfare has changed – and sets the stage for examining why traditional maneuver warfare has been so blunted in the modern era, especially by new technologies like drones.

Drone Warfare and the Shift from Maneuver to Attrition

One of the defining features of the Ukraine war (and 21st-century conflicts) is the pervasive use of drones and advanced sensors, which has fundamentally altered the balance between maneuver and attrition warfare. In Alexander’s time, battlefield awareness was limited to line-of-sight and messenger reports; commanders could mass forces and achieve surprise operationally. In Ukraine, by contrast, ubiquitous ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) – especially via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – means that large force movements are quickly detected and targeted. Modern drones (ranging from small quadcopters to larger Turkish Bayraktar TB2s or Iranian Shaheds) have become “eyes in the sky,” constantly scouting enemy positions and directing precision fire. Ukrainian forces have leveraged tactical drones to devastating effect: roughly two-thirds of Russian combat losses are now inflicted by drones – making drones “twice as effective as every other weapon in the Ukrainian arsenal,” according to a RUSI studydefenseone.com. This includes drones spotting for artillery, as well as loitering munitions and first-person-view (FPV) attack drones directly striking tanks and infantry.

The result is that any attempt at maneuver – moving large armored columns or massing troops for an offensive – is immediately perilous. As military analyst Alex Vershinin observes, modern battlefields are an “integrated system of systems”: layered air defenses, electronic warfare, long-range precision fires, and drones on both sides create overlapping threat zonesrusi.orgrusi.org. It has become “easier to mass fires than forces”, because “deep manoeuvre, which requires massing of combat power, is no longer possible – any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth.”rusi.org In Ukraine, whenever Russia tried old-style maneuvers (e.g. armored thrusts early in the war), Ukrainian drones and artillery (particularly precision-guided HIMARS and tube artillery guided by drones) wreaked havoc on exposed units. Conversely, when Ukraine attempted maneuver offensives (e.g. its mid-2023 counteroffensive pushing through Russian lines in Zaporizhzhia), Russian reconnaissance drones and extensive use of mines and artillery dramatically slowed progress. Both sides have had to disperse forces and move extremely cautiously, often at night or under electronic silence, to avoid being spotted and destroyed.

Drone-enabled attrition favors defensive, firepower-centric operations. Small quadcopter drones allow even platoon-level units to surveil a wide area and call in artillery within minutes. This means an attacking force cannot easily achieve surprise or concentrate superiority at a point – traditional maneuver warfare’s key tenets – without being detected. If dozens of tanks assemble for a breakthrough, they are likely to come under precise bombardment (as happened to Russian armored groups near Vuhledar in 2023, which were ambushed largely thanks to Ukrainian drone observation). In effect, the “reconnaissance-strike complex” – the integration of drones, sensors, and long-range fires – turns the battlefield into a near-transparent grid where movement equals vulnerabilityrusi.orgrusi.org. This dynamic has forced both Russian and Ukrainian militaries into a mode of attritional, positional warfare: digging extensive trenches, fortifying, and only advancing in small units under cover of heavy supporting fire and electronic jamming.

Not only do drones find targets, but they also themselves act as cheap, expendable precision weapons. Both sides deploy loitering munitions (e.g. Russia’s Lancet drones, Ukraine’s Switchblade drones) to destroy artillery, air defenses, or logistics far behind the front. This further expands the threat to maneuver units even in their rear areas – nowhere is safe from observation and strike.

Moreover, electronic warfare (EW) and cyber elements play a huge role. Drones can be jammed or spoofed, but both sides adapt with new tactics or resistant tech. The net effect is a constant duel that adds complexity and slows operations. A poignant illustration from Ukraine: a deliberate attack by even a small unit requires coordinating EW to jam enemy drones and sensors, counter-battery radar to suppress enemy artillery, and one’s own drones to provide ISR and instant strike on discovered targets – all this just to let, say, a platoon of 30 men advance a short distancerusi.orgrusi.org. Vershinin describes how an attacking platoon needs multiple layers of EW, artillery, air defense, and engineer support to survive, and if any piece fails, the attackers will suffer “horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy”rusi.orgrusi.org. This extreme complexity means offensive maneuvers must be meticulously planned and centrally coordinated, yet even then proceed slowly to keep all systems in sync. Such conditions are the antithesis of the kind of fluid, rapid maneuver that Alexander the Great or even 20th-century generals practiced.

In essence, drone warfare has shifted the paradigm toward attrition. It rewards the side that uses the “force-centric” approach (focusing on destroying the enemy’s capacity) over the “terrain-centric” approach (capturing ground)rusi.org. In Ukraine, we see Russia inflicting punishment with drones and artillery not necessarily to immediately seize land, but to incrementally whittle down Ukraine’s forces (a grim calculus where territory is secondary to wearing out the opponent – though at immense cost to Russia’s own troops as well). The traditional notion of maneuver – swift flanking movements, deep penetrations to disrupt the enemy rear – is “fundamentally altered” because any penetration beyond the protective umbrella of one’s own anti-air and EW coverage invites annihilationrusi.orgrusi.org. An armored column thrusting rapidly forward would quickly move out of range of its air defenses and electronic jammers, becoming easy prey for enemy drones and precision rockets. This is why we have not seen deep armor breakthroughs in Ukraine akin to e.g. the U.S. 2003 march to Baghdad; instead, offenses advance methodically, securing their flanks and using “creeping barrages” of artillery to suppress defenders rather than bypass them.

Additionally, cheap drones level the playing field. A small quadcopter or $1,000 FPV drone can destroy or disable a multi-million-dollar tank by dropping a grenade through an open hatch or exploding against it. This invertes the cost equation of offense vs defense. In Alexander’s time, and up through much of modern history, a highly trained offensive force could outmatch raw levies – quality often beat quantity decisively (as Alexander’s phalanx did). But in Ukraine, quantity (of cheap drones, artillery shells, simple anti-tank weapons) imposes attrition on quality (expensive tanks, elite units). It becomes a matter of industrial output and resilience, not just generalship. As one RUSI commentary notes, “wars of attrition are won by economies, not armies… the fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives”rusi.orgrusi.org. Russia learned this the hard way in 2022: chasing rapid territorial gains (maneuver) led to unsustainable losses and logistics failures, so they shifted to grinding attrition. Ukraine too, in its 2023 counteroffensive, initially attempted combined-arms maneuver through minefields and found it exceedingly hard – they adapted by returning to artillery duels and very slow, methodical advances with sappers clearing mines under drone observation.

In summary, drones have made the modern battlefield extremely transparent and lethal, favoring those who attrit the enemy from a distance over those who maneuver boldly. This is a fundamental change from Alexander’s era (or even WWII), where bold maneuver could yield decisive victory. Now, any such boldness is likely to be checked by a swarm of aerial observers and precision fires.

Implications for Modern Military Doctrine

The experiences of the Russia-Ukraine war, set against the backdrop of historical maneuver campaigns like Alexander the Great’s, offer several clear lessons for modern military doctrine:

• 1. Maneuver Warfare Requires New Suppression Strategies: Traditional maneuver warfare is not dead, but to be viable it must account for the ubiquitous drone threat. Militaries will need robust counter-UAV defenses and electronic warfare in every echelon. The concept of a “protective bubble” covering advancing forces is now crucial – as noted, an offensive needs layered air defense, EW, and counter-artillery moving in concert with assault unitsrusi.orgrusi.org. Future doctrines must integrate these elements as standard for any maneuver unit. For example, a tank brigade of tomorrow might have organic anti-drone lasers or jammers, and artillery dedicated to quickly knocking out enemy rocket batteries the moment a drone spots them. Without such integration, any large-scale maneuver risks instant destruction.
• 2. Attrition Warfare and Logistics Capacity: The war reinforces that logistics and industrial staying power are paramount. A modern peer conflict can rapidly turn into an attritional slugfest (as in Ukraine), so doctrine must emphasize sustaining forces under high consumption rates. Western militaries, which have long prioritized lean, high-tech forces for quick wars, are re-learning the need for stockpiles of munitions, surge manufacturing capacity, and replacement units. The West is “not prepared” for protracted, high-casualty war and tends to view long attritional fights as anomaliesrusi.org. This war is forcing a shift: doctrines are incorporating the idea that future wars against near-peer foes may default to attrition, and thus forces must be structured to absorb losses and keep fighting (e.g. having reserve formations, depot-level repair units, and training pipelines to replace casualties – much as Alexander absorbed local troops to replenish his ranks).
• 3. Reconsideration of Offensive vs Defensive Balance: Modern doctrine will likely put more emphasis on defensive operations or extremely well-prepared limited offensives, given how costly offense has become. The old Clausewitzian strive for decisive battle is replaced by the mindset that wearing down the enemy’s materiel and morale over time might be more realistic. As RUSI’s analysis suggests, trying to force a decision via maneuver can backfire in an attrition-dominated environmentrusi.orgrusi.org. This doesn’t mean giving up on maneuver entirely, but picking the right moments and methods (perhaps surprise strategic maneuvers in domains less susceptible to drone observation, like cyber or space, or very rapid strikes at narrow points combined with deception). Deception and electronic spoofing will grow in importance – to maneuver, you must first fool or blind the enemy’s sensors. We saw hints of this when Ukraine used decoys and EW to confuse Russian gunners, or when Russia employs smoke screens and decoy targets to mitigate HIMARS strikes. Future doctrines may formalize the use of decoy units (fake tanks, simulated radio traffic) to create openings for real maneuvers.
• 4. Training and Decentralization: The complexity of coordinating drones, EW, fires, and maneuver means militaries need highly trained staff and flexible command-and-control. Vershinin notes that “dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing”rusi.orgrusi.org. Rigid top-down control (which hampered Russian units) is ill-suited to the fluid, sensor-rich battlefield where junior leaders might need to make quick decisions to dodge a drone strike or exploit a sudden weakness. Thus, Western doctrine – traditionally more decentralized – is being vindicated, and even Russia is reportedly moving to empower lower-level commanders out of necessity. The human element – creativity, adaptability, morale – still matters. Ukrainian troops using cheap commercial drones have often out-thought a larger Russian force by improvising tactics. This suggests doctrine should encourage innovation and battlefield entrepreneurship, teaching soldiers how to fight “dronified” warfare creatively (for instance, using drone swarms to screen an advance, or timing an attack during a lapse in enemy drone coverage such as bad weather or shift change).
• 5. Combined Arms 2.0: We’re seeing the emergence of what might be called “combined arms 2.0,” where traditional arms (infantry, armor, artillery) are inseparable from cyber/electronic and aerial robotic components. Modern doctrine will treat drones/EW as co-equal “arms” in planning operations. Already, Ukraine has dedicated drone reconnaissance units and Russia has stood up “Shock” EW battalions. In effect, any maneuver element must have a complementary “electronic and drone overwatch” element. The implication is forces will be more modular and networked. The DELTA battlefield management system Ukraine uses (with real-time drone feeds and target data-sharing) is a prototype of this future, where every unit has a digital picture of the battlefield. The successful employment of such systems points to a future doctrine of digital maneuver – moving not just physical units but also dominating the information space so that the enemy is outmaneuvered virtually (their communications jammed, their drones downed, while yours fly free).
• 6. Resilience and Civilian Integration: The Ukraine war has also highlighted the role of civilian technology and society in modern war. Cheap commercial drones, civilian satellite imagery (e.g. Starlink), and volunteer tech communities became part of Ukraine’s war effort. Modern doctrine might formally incorporate civilian assets into defense (e.g. a reserve of civilian drone operators or an official program to crowdsource targeting intel). This is a lesson in resilience: Ukraine’s ability to mobilize society and innovate with off-the-shelf tech helped counter Russia’s numerical advantage. For militaries, this means embracing non-traditional tactics and equipment in doctrine – the “DIY drone” is now a fixture of war.

In conclusion, maneuver warfare as traditionally understood is forever changed by current technologies. The Ukraine conflict demonstrates that large-scale rapid offensives will face unprecedented challenges from pervasive surveillance and precision strike capabilities. Future doctrine will likely blend the lessons of Alexander – the value of bold strategy, logistics, and morale – with the hard lessons of Ukraine – the need to survive and suppress the digital battlefield before attempting physical maneuver. Militaries that adapt to integrate drones, electronic warfare, and resilient logistics will be better poised to conduct successful campaigns. Those that do not will face brutal attrition.

Ultimately, the comparison is sobering: Alexander could vanquish empires through genius and speed, but a modern great power finds itself mired in a costly slog. In the 21st century, the swift swords of antiquity have given way to the unblinking drones of attrition, and doctrine must evolve accordingly to reclaim any measure of decisive maneuver in warfare.

Sources:

• Arrian (trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt), The Campaigns of Alexander, for primary descriptions of Alexander’s battles.
• Engels, Donald. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army – analysis of Alexander’s supply and movement strategies.
• History.com – How Alexander the Great Conquered the Persian Empire, summarizing key battles and tactics. europe.factsanddetails.comeurope.factsanddetails.com
• Wikipedia: “Wars of Alexander the Great” – casualty figures and scope of conquestsen.wikipedia.orgtimemaps.com.
• Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and BBC News – daily campaign updates for Ukraine war (territory and operations).russiamatters.orgaxios.com
• Euromaidan Press – analysis of Russian casualty-to-territory ratioseuromaidanpress.comeuromaidanpress.com.
• Kyiv Independent – report on Russian losses per km² in 2024 offensivekyivindependent.com.
• PBS News/AP – Prigozhin’s admission of 20k Wagner dead at Bakhmutpbs.org.
• Defense One (Gen. V. Zaluzhnyi) – on Ukrainian drones causing two-thirds of Russian lossesdefenseone.com.
• RUSI (Alex Vershinin, 2024) – “The Attritional Art of War”, on how modern tech inhibits deep maneuverrusi.orgrusi.org.
• CFR Global Conflict Tracker – summary of war status (20% of Ukraine occupied, ~4k km² gained in 2024)cfr.org.
• Royal United Services Institute and IISS analyses – for modern warfare implications and strategy shiftsrusi.orgrusi.org.

• Arrian (trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt), The Campaigns of Alexander, for primary descriptions of Alexander’s battles.
• Engels, Donald. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army – analysis of Alexander’s supply and movement strategies.
• History.com – How Alexander the Great Conquered the Persian Empire, summarizing key battles and tactics. europe.factsanddetails.comeurope.factsanddetails.com
• Wikipedia: “Wars of Alexander the Great” – casualty figures and scope of conquestsen.wikipedia.orgtimemaps.com.
• Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and BBC News – daily campaign updates for Ukraine war (territory and operations).russiamatters.orgaxios.com
• Euromaidan Press – analysis of Russian casualty-to-territory ratioseuromaidanpress.comeuromaidanpress.com.
• Kyiv Independent – report on Russian losses per km² in 2024 offensivekyivindependent.com.
• PBS News/AP – Prigozhin’s admission of 20k Wagner dead at Bakhmutpbs.org.
• Defense One (Gen. V. Zaluzhnyi) – on Ukrainian drones causing two-thirds of Russian lossesdefenseone.com.
• RUSI (Alex Vershinin, 2024) – “The Attritional Art of War”, on how modern tech inhibits deep maneuverrusi.orgrusi.org.
• CFR Global Conflict Tracker – summary of war status (20% of Ukraine occupied, ~4k km² gained in 2024)cfr.org.
• Royal United Services Institute and IISS analyses – for modern warfare implications and strategy shiftsrusi.orgrusi.org.